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The Difference between Knowledge and Understanding - final 
Sherrilyn Roush 
King’s College London 
 
Short Abstract: 
Characterizing Gettier cases as failures of probabilistic relevance matching, 
and knowledge as tracking, we can explain the nature and value of knowledge 
simultaneously. Avoidance of gettierization has the independent value of 
improving understanding of why p is true, and relevance matching gives a 
theory of understanding as distinct from knowledge. 
Medium Abstract: 
I characterize Gettier cases as failures of understanding, and give a theory of 
what it is to understand why proposition p is true. This view is based on the 
concept of probabilistic relevance matching, having one’s dispositions to 
believe p mirror the probabilistic relations that p has to all other matters. Based 
in probability, the view yields a clear relationship, and also distinction, between 
the concept of understanding and the concept of knowledge defined in terms 
of probabilistic tracking. With these tools we are able to see that gettierization 
avoidance has a value independent of the value of knowledge, viz. 
understanding, but that it is also in the nature of tracking-type knowledge to 
discourage gettierization quite specifically. The concept of understanding here 
captures several key features of this phenomenon, such as breadth, depth, 




In the aftermath of Gettier’s examples, knowledge came to be thought of as 
what you would have if in addition to a true belief and your favorite epistemic 
goody, such as justifiedness, you also were ungettiered, and the theory of 
knowledge was frequently equated, especially by its detractors, with the 
project of pinning down that extra bit. It would follow that knowledge 
contributes something distinctive that makes it indispensable in our pantheon 
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of epistemic concepts only if avoiding gettierization has a value that can be 
explained without presupposing the value of knowledge. 
Tracking-type knowledge has a value that no other logically possible 
conditions on true belief does. As an Evolutionarily Stable Strategy it 
preserves appropriate belief states through time and changing circumstances. 
If we characterize gettierization through the concept of relevance matching, 
then we see that avoiding gettierization has a value independent of that of 
knowledge, namely, understanding, and that it is unnecessary to add a clause 
to the tracking conditions to make them suppress gettierization directly, though 
fallibly. The bright line of value is between gettierization avoidance and 
understanding on the one hand and knowledge on the other, and so should be 
the bright line defining concepts.  
The concept of relevance matching is key to a definition of what it is to 
understand why p is true, as opposed merely to knowing that p is true. Perfect 
tracking implies perfect relevance matching, so knowledge and understanding 
are intimately connected but understanding also requires that one own states 
that accomplish the relevance matching rather than achieving it vicariously. 
The theory of understanding based on relevance matching implies that 
understanding requires appreciation of not only p but its connections to other 
matters, and explains how it is possible to know that p is true without 
understanding why. The view implies that understanding is literally simulation, 
and is suggestive about understanding other minds. 
 
1.  What is the Gettier Problem? 
 In formulating the problem that bears his name Edmund Gettier stepped back 
from traditional thinking about knowledge and named something he thought all of the 
views had in common despite the differences among them that previous discussions had 
focused on.1 They all defined knowledge as true belief plus justifiedness, however they 
went on to describe the latter property. (Gettier 1962) Thus in providing examples 
where the subjects are intuitively justified but something was missing that it seemed 
most natural to call “knowledge”, the Gettier Problem opened up space for thinking 
about what knowledge is that was not restricted to what we would now call internalist 
justifiedness of belief. Since this problem was identified many alternative conceptions of 
justification have been defined and continue to flourish, internalist concepts of 
justification have been refined and better understood, and in the process philosophers 
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have made explicit dimensions of knowledge itself that were not discussed until this 
period, for example, defeasibility (Lehrer and Paxson 1969), reliability (Goldman 1967, 
1976; Dretske 1971; Nozick 1981), and virtue (Sosa 1991, Zagzebski 1996). The Gettier 
cases also presented a challenge for fallibilism as such (Zagzebski 1994), and have forced 
us to think about the nature and role of luck in a term of appraisal of epistemic 
achievement (Pritchard 2005). For all that one might deplore a scholastic style of 
conceptual analysis that the problem gave rise to, the provocation it gave also had 
positive, enlightening consequences, both substantively and methodologically. 
Even granting this is valuable work, though, one could regard it as a distant side effect of 
a project that is itself pointless: finding a gettier-proof definition of knowledge. The 
most interesting arguments in this direction are not that the project is doomed to 
failure, which seems obvious, but that it would have no value if it succeeded. One 
argument to this effect, made by Mark Kaplan in the 1980s, takes it as a requirement of 
epistemological theorizing that it advance or clarify the conduct of inquiry. (Kaplan 
1985) The search for an anti-gettierization clause to close the gap between justified true 
belief and knowledge does not do this, he argues, because in inquiry once we check that 
we have a justification, broadly speaking2, for our belief there is nothing more that we 
can check to make sure that our justified belief is in addition knowledge, in the sense of 
gettier-proof. Thus, whatever the successful anti-gettierization clause gave us would be 
of no use. This criticism is not as satisfying as one might like, I think, since it presumes 
we know ahead of time that whatever property the anti-gettierization clause identifies 
is something we already know enough to take into account when we go about checking 
that we have good evidence. This is less open than I would like to be to the possibilities 
that we do not fully understand the gettierization phenomenon, and that our current 
practices are incomplete. 
An argument that takes the line a step further, that whatever the anti-gettierization 
clause identifies is not of epistemic value, comes more recently from Jon Kvanvig. 
(Kvanvig 2003) He takes it that if theorizing does not show its worth in practice or in any 
other way, it can and should offer explanations of its subject matter. In particular, he 
expects a theory of the nature of knowledge to explain why knowledge is valuable, more 
valuable than mere true belief. However, he argues, no account of why knowledge is 
valuable can also serve as a theory of its nature. The going accounts of what it is about 
knowledge that makes it valuable may succeed, but they do not naturally address the 
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Gettier Problem, so a definition – a proper statement of the nature of knowledge – will 
require the addition of further clauses to rule out the problematic Gettier cases. The 
prospects are dim for finding clauses that succeed, but even if we succeeded they would 
always be ad hoc and gerrymandered patches on a sleek property already identified as 
making knowledge more valuable than mere true belief.  
It is not only that such modifications make for an ugly definition, but that it is unclear 
how fulfillment of any of the further conditions proposed would add value to true belief 
plus subjective justification or intellectual virtuosity, or one’s favorite alternative 
criterion beyond true belief. And if we said that their value is that they get us finally to 
knowledge, then we would be presupposing the value of knowledge in order to explain 
the value of one of its components, that very component that made us call the property 
knowledge rather than the more limited phenomenon of justified, or virtuous, or … true 
belief. If the gettier-proof phenomenon has no added value over a gettier-prone 
property that straightforwardly adds value to mere true belief, then it is hard to see why 
the study of the gettier-proof phenomenon – that is, the defining of knowledge as that 
project had come to be pursued – has any value either. One might think an 
epistemologist should be embarrassed to take the position that knowledge is not 
valuable, but Kvanvig points out in his defense that clear value has been attributed to 
phenomena that are (or are taken by some to be) components of knowledge – 
subjective justification, intellectual virtuosity, etc. – and this does some justice to the 
everyday intuition that knowledge has value. 
A theorist of knowledge thus has two challenges, one to say why the property X that she 
takes to be required beyond true belief adds value to mere true belief, the other – the 
secondary value problem – why the further property that provides gettier-proofing adds 
value to true belief plus X, and she must do the second without presupposing that 
knowledge is valuable. The suspicion that a gettier-proof definition of knowledge will 
always be gerrymandered is what makes these distinct challenges: if property X had 
done the job of gettier-proofing, the second problem would be solved by the solution to 
the first. In my favorite definition of knowledge the X property that goes beyond true 
belief is not subjective justification or intellectual virtuosity but tracking, so my first task 
in this paper will be to explain how tracking adds value to mere true belief. 
Tracking also does a lot to gettier-proof our beliefs, but as with all fallibilist criteria 
Gettier cases will be possible. However, instead of launching a search for further 
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conditions to narrow that gap, I will investigate gettierization taken by itself, without 
concern for the theory of knowledge. This is not because knowledge lacks value, or is 
not to be understood through the value of its constituents, but because, as I will argue, 
avoidance of gettierization has a nature and value of its own that does not rest on that 
of knowledge. The value of knowledge defined as requiring tracking also does not rest 
on it. Following these lines we should conclude that the mistake has been to try to force 
the concepts of knowledge and of gettierization avoidance into the same box, by 
assuming that knowledge must take the form of true belief + X + an anti-gettierization 
clause. 
If we want to carve our concepts along the bright lines in the field of values of the 
phenomena, we have another option than those that have been explored thus far. We 
can take knowledge to be defined by tracking, and take gettierization avoidance to 
define a different concept. In developing my account of what gettierization is, we will 
see that this other concept is most naturally taken to be understanding. Both concepts, 
of knowledge and of understanding, will be defined by sleek properties, and their value 
will be understood through the value of all of their components. Gettierization 
avoidance is not per se a part of the value of knowledge, so it will not be a separable 
part of the definition of knowledge, though the tracking property that defines 
knowledge will naturally, fallibly, target what is gettierization-specific.  
The one bit of violence this account will do to widespread intuitions is to allow some 
Gettier cases to be counted as knowledge. However, this is superior to Kvanvig’s 
approach in that he neither gives an account of the nature nor of the value of 
knowledge in terms of its constituents, nor offers anything to explain the intuition that 
something epistemically valuable is missing in Gettier cases. My carving of the concept 
of knowledge, and my account of gettierization as failure of a property that defines 
understanding, achieve both. Something is missing in Gettier cases, but it is not 
knowledge; it is understanding.  
 
2. Knowledge is more valuable than mere true belief. 
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If knowledge is tracking, then it has a high value that mere true belief does not. To 
explain that value, I will give an outline of how it is derived, following an account given 
earlier. (Roush 2010) We start with a game that a subject plays with Nature.  
Nature ↓   You  b(p) -b(p) 
P (0, 10) (0, -20) 
-p (0, -7) (0, 5) 
 
In any given round of the game Nature has two options, to make proposition p true or 
to make p false. In a given round the subject’s options are to believe p or not believe p. 
To have a game there must be payoffs associated with the four possible outcomes. 
Nature’s payoffs are in the first position in each ordered pair, and those of the subject, 
say you, are in the second spot. Nature is indifferent to the consequences of the play so 
her payoffs are zero in every possible outcome. The particular numbers corresponding 
to your payoffs do not matter, but some of their relationships do. I will assume that we 
are concerned with p for which when p is true it is better for you to believe it than not 
to believe it, and when p is false it is better not to believe it than to believe it. These 
payoff assumptions are sufficient for derivation of the value of tracking-type knowledge 
that I describe here, and they are also necessary.  
There are a great many p that satisfy these conditions, but what eventually comes out of 
this derivation may lead one to suspect that the result was rigged by these payoff 
assumptions. However, this is definitely not so, for several reasons. First, the challenge 
to explain the value of knowledge is that of explaining why it is more valuable than mere 
true belief. No one has so far expected us to explain why knowledge of p is valuable for 
p where true belief is not valuable, or where avoiding false belief has no value, probably 
because we would not normally expect knowledge to be valuable in such cases either.  
So, the payoff assumptions about which states are more valuable than which are not 
begging the explanatory question, and they are not a qualification on the answer to the 
value question.  
Second, the payoff assumptions do not trivialize the result I will describe by being only 
trivially different from the result. This is because the payoffs concern belief states, and 
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the result will be about strategies. Strategies are dispositions or regularities in your 
responses to the plays of the other player. So, they are conditional, and modal, and 
general; they are rules. States are outcomes in a single round of the game. In a given 
round, you may land in a comparatively good state or a comparatively bad state. In our 
game the upper left and lower right outcomes are best for you among your possibilities, 
because they have the best payoffs. 10 > -20 and 5 > -7. The lower left and upper right 
possibilities are comparatively bad. These good and bad outcomes in a given round are 
not assumed to be any more than co-incidences of two things, p’s truth or falsity, and 
belief or non-belief in p, on a given occasion. 
Strategies are different because a strategy is a general rule for responding to all the 
possible plays of the other player, so it is a set of conditionals, and it will have 
consequences for where you land how frequently in all or a large fraction of trials of the 
game. As for strategies in all game theory, so here, no assumption is made that they 
involve conscious or deliberate actions. A strategy need only be a regularity of response, 
here of belief response. Pancreatic cells have strategies in the intended sense because 
they respond to the presence of sugar by producing insulin and to the absence of sugar 
by not producing insulin. However, differently from some game theory, here I do not 
assume in the definition of the game that the player of belief states has knowledge of 
which play Nature has made. The game is not that you will be told whether p is true or 
false and decide whether to believe it. Knowledge will exist, when it does, at the level of 
strategies, which we will evaluate in terms of their game-theoretic properties. Thus, 
representation of the value question as a game does not beg the question of what 
counts as knowledge or what its value is. 
An example of a strategy in the true belief game is the following: 
When nature plays p, play –b(p).  
When nature plays –p, play –b(p). 
Probabilistically,  
P(-b(p)/p) > s, for some high s 
P(-b(p)/-p) > t, for some high t 
This would be a good strategy for someone who wanted to avoid mistaken beliefs at all 
cost, perhaps Descartes in certain moods. However, it would not be good for a subject 
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with the payoff structure we assumed above, for whom when p is true it is better that 
he believe p than not believe p. This strategy would lead him to believe p on (roughly) 
only 1-s of the occasions on which it is true. 
Another strategy is given by the following two conditions: 
 
P(-b(p)/-p) > s ≤ 1  variation (sensitivity) 
P(b(p)/p) > t ≤ 1  adherence 
 
These are the tracking conditions, which are dispositional, and the pair of them form an 
example of a strategy in the true belief game because they say what your belief state 
does in response to all of the possible plays of nature, p and not-p: You satisfy them if 
the probability you do not believe p given that p is false is high, and the probability you 
do believe p given that p is true is high. That is, in response to nature’s play of not-p, you 
play no belief and in response to nature’s play of p you play belief most of the time in 
most of the ways that p could be false or true (s = t = high). In other work I have 
developed these conditions as a definition of knowledge; here we see that they form a 
strategy in the true belief game.  
To respond according to the tracking strategy is not a mere choice, and sometimes not a 
choice at all. It is possible to exhibit the tracking strategy without a decision or 
deliberate effort, and usually a mere decision to have it does nothing to help you fulfill 
it. An example of the first occurs in perception, where we get the equipment to fulfill 
this strategy for free from having normal organs. We do not choose to believe there is a 
tiger if and only if there is one. There are situations – maybe this is one of them – 
where, as with pancreatic cells and insulin secretion, we could not choose to believe 
otherwise if we tried.  
For an example of the second, where a mere choice does not get us the status of having 
the tracking strategy, take any proposition investigated by scientists. For a dramatic 
case, consider the existence of the Higgs boson. If human beings are to have the 
tracking dispositions for this p we have to acquire them, which in this case requires 
building something like a Large Hadron Collider. The harder a thing is to know, the more 
work will be required to acquire the tracking dispositions. Our task in getting ourselves 
to fulfill the tracking conditions when these dispositions did not, as in perception, come 
for free, is to get ourselves dispositions to detect which play Nature has made.  
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There are an infinite number of logically possible response strategies in the true belief 
game other than the tracking dispositions, and they correspond to all possible general 
conditions on the relation between p and your belief in p, and so all possible definitions 
of knowledge of the form true belief + X that do not have tracking among their 
requirements. As long as the condition in a theory of knowledge is general it can be 
written as a strategy. The X of a given theory of knowledge (e.g., good reason to believe, 
reliable process of belief formation) is extensionally equivalent to some strategy 
because the X provides an answer for every situation where p is true and p is false as to 
whether the subject who fulfills X believes p. Does the subject who is virtuous believe p 
in this situation when p is true? Does the reliable subject believe p when it is false in 
that situation? For cases where the X property does not determine whether the subject 
believes p, it will either give a probability of that or saying nothing at all. If the X 
property says nothing to determine what the subject’s belief state is, that is 
extensionally equivalent to specifying a random response.3  
We can now compare how all of these strategies serve us in the true belief game. With 
thresholds s and t set at 95%, the tracking strategy leads us to land in the winning upper 
left and lower right squares almost all of the time. I.e., in 95% of the rounds of the game 
we win. In order to judge other strategies in comparison to this, the true belief game 
must be converted into a symmetric signaling game with all strategies compared to each 
other as each plays to win the game with Nature. Suppressing the details, if we call the 
tracking strategy R then all the other possible strategies (i.e., other theories of 
knowledge) are members of -R, and we get an interesting implication: the subject who is 
a tracker of p has what is called an Evolutionarily Stable Strategy (ESS). 
What this means is that the tracking type strictly dominates any type following any 
other conditions beyond true belief, in the struggle for survival and utiles. Any given 
round can be lost by any individual, but this type wins over time. This is significant for 
the triviality worry one might be having again: far from being trivial it is not just that 
tracking has an added value over mere true belief, but that its added value is unique: no 
other logically possible added condition on knowledge – for example, justifiedness, 
virtue, reliable process, etc. – will swamp or even match the value tracking adds to mere 
true belief. The ESS property is very strong game-theoretically because its consequences 
hold regardless of the dynamics of interaction, that is, regardless of how or how often 
subjects meet, reproduce, exchange information, and choose their next plays in light of 
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past outcomes. It follows that if we think intuitively that knowledge can be of 
evolutionary or utilitarian value, then having the ESS property is a unique explanatory 
advantage of the tracking theory.  
What does the added value of an ESS amount to intuitively, for a human being in real 
life? Suppose you want to go to Larissa. You believe route A will get you there by 12, and 
suppose this is actually true. Suppose that when p is true it is more valuable to you to be 
in a state believing p than not believing p and when p is false it is more valuable to you 
to not believe p than to believe p. To satisfy these conditions it is sufficient that you do 
want to get to Larissa by 12. If so, then these days you have a choice, whether to use a 
paper map or real-time GPS.  
If you use a paper map then you may have a true belief when you start, and it may turn 
out that you continue to be right as you wend you way down the road, but there are 
other possibilities, such as road work and impassable traffic.  If you use GPS (and it 
works) you will be prepared for these possibilities. Even without GPS you will of course 
learn of these obstructions when you get to them, but if you had used GPS (and it 
worked) you would have detected them ahead of time and had more time to adjust. You 
are more likely to get to your appointment in time if you use GPS. The obstruction 
scenario might not end up being actual – in which case you will turn out to actually have 
a true belief whichever method you use. But impassable traffic and road construction 
are possible at the beginning your trip, and remain realistic possibilities as you continue 
down the road. 
What do you have in that GPS that you do not have in a map? You have strong tracking, 
in the specific sense of a strong and fine-grained disposition to believe p when it is true 
and not believe p when it is false. This disposition that you have now prepares you for 
non-actual possibilities where this road will not get you to Larissa by 12, possibilities 
that could become actual at any time during your journey. If you use a map then you 
will track a little – if that road did not even geographically link your current location with 
your destination, then a decent map would not advise you to believe it did – but the 
tracking is at a much lower level. It prepares you for fewer scenarios alternative to the 
actual, so your variation and adherence probabilities are conformably lower. 
The general upshot is that if you use the GPS then you have a true belief plus a 
contingency detector, one value of which is preparedness, a value that you possess now 
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because of the GPS and hence tracking you have now. If your utilities concerning belief 
states are going to remain the same, then a tracking device is what you want to have 
now. This applies to any contingent proposition whose truth value matters to you, 
because its truth value may change. 
Accounting for the value of knowledge in terms of its being an Evolutionary Stable 
Strategy may sound all tooth and claw, but there is nothing in the ESS property that 
restricts the value it brings to consequentialist or even practical terms. Here the true 
belief was valuable because we wanted to go to Larissa but there need not be any 
further thing, practical or otherwise for which the true belief states serve as a means to 
an end. You may now want to have true beliefs and not false beliefs about German 
literature just for the sake of it. As long as you now are someone to whom it is valuable 
to have such states in the future too, or to whom the continued existence of a type – 
the knower-of-German-literature type – is valuable, tracking-style knowledge will be 
more valuable to you now than mere true belief.  
The contingencies that tracking makes you good against need not take the form of 
changes to the truth value of the proposition believed, as it does in the case of the road 
to Larissa. Even if no contingency will change the truth value of the proposition, as in 
the case of facts about historical German literature, there are still many contingencies 
that affect whether you believe the proposition, and do so differently in different 
circumstances. If you care about maintaining an appropriate belief state with respect to 
p, believing p if and only if it is true, then you need to care not only about believing or 
not believing p now when it is true or false respectively, but also that your belief state 
does not change in response to cues suggesting it is false though it is not or true though 
it is not. Tracking gives you that.  
3. What is so bad about Gettierization? 
Valuable though knowledge is, one does not need to care about it in the slightest in 
order to be concerned about Gettier cases. This is because, as I will argue, avoiding 
gettierization has a distinctive value that does not depend at all on the value of 
knowledge.   
There is an impressive menu of interesting, intuitive, and fruitful ways of thinking of 
Gettier cases. I do not claim any of these accounts is wrong, but I will add another to the 
list, and characterize these cases in terms of probabilistic relevance. To begin with, a 
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bare bones intuitive way of describing the problem is that despite the subject’s belief 
being justified, what makes the subject believe p is not what makes p true. Consider a 
case modeled on one of Gettier’s original examples. Imagine an office with three 
workers, Smith, Jones, and Brown. Smith and Jones are friends but neither of them 
knows Brown. Smith was with Jones when he bought a Ford car, and since then Jones 
has given Smith a ride to work in it every day. So Smith believes q, that Jones owns a 
Ford, and has good reason to believe it. Smith also believes p, that someone in the office 
owns a Ford, whether he thinks about it explicitly or not. After all, that follows logically 
and trivially. And so, Smith has a justified belief in p, surely.  
However, it turns out that a few years back Jones decided to change the status of his 
car, and now leases it instead of owning it. q is false, though Jones neglected to tell 
Smith about this change because it did not qualify as an interesting life event, and he is 
still driving the same car. We know that q false does not imply that p is false. p might be 
true for a different reason, and so it is in our example. Though Jones does not own a 
Ford, nevertheless someone in the office owns a Ford because, as it happens, Brown 
does. 
Smith’s belief in p is true, and was justified. He had good reason to believe it – we 
cannot expect him to rule out all logically possible ways of being wrong or we would 
never count anyone as justified. But a lot of us have the feeling he does not have 
knowledge, so this and many like it look like counterexamples to the traditional theory 
of knowledge. One way of describing why is that despite the fact that he is justified he 
still gets a true belief only accidently, by double luck. He had bad luck with his 
justification, and then luckily had perfectly compensating good luck with the truth value 
of p.  
Another way of describing what is wrong, that is present in all of the Gettier cases I have 
seen, is that what makes p true is not what makes the subject believe it. What makes it 
true that someone in the office owns a Ford is that Brown owns a Ford. What makes 
Smith believe that someone in the office owns a Ford are facts about Jones. I will gloss 
this situation by saying that what is relevant to S’s believing p is not relevant to a similar 
degree, to p’s being true, or vice versa. In our case, whether Brown owns a Ford is not 
relevant to whether Smith believes someone in the office owns a Ford. Only Jones is 
relevant to that. But whether Brown owns a Ford is relevant to whether in fact someone 
in the office owns a Ford. 
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I will express these relevance relations more precisely in probability. To begin: 
P(b(p)/-q.r) = P(b(p)/-q.-r) 
P(p/-q.r) ≠ P(p/-q.-r) 
The first equation says that the probability that Smith believes p given that Jones does 
not own a Ford is the same whether Brown owns a Ford or not. Smith is not paying any 
attention to Brown. The problem is that Brown does make a difference to whether p is 
true when Jones does not own a Ford. As in the second equation, the probability of p 
given that Jones does not own a Ford is different depending on whether Brown owns a 
Ford  or not. Now when a Smith so described who believes p when he believes q makes 
an improbable mistake of believing q when q is false, the difference between his belief 
dispositions and the dependences between things in the world will be exposed. His 
belief in p will be either false or Gettiered, depending on whether Brown does not or 
does own a Ford respectively.4 
We can get a better feel for the relevance point by writing it out more fully. First, here is 
what it is for q to be highly positively relevant to whether you believe p: 
P(b(p)/q) >> P(b(p)/-q) 
You are much more likely to believe p given that q is true than you are given that q is 
false. q’s truth value is something you rely on in believing or not believing p. This can 
also be written as the ratio of those two terms being much greater than 1: 
P(b(p)/q)|P(b(p)/-q) >> 1 
There is another, distinct, question, whether q is positively relevant to p’s being true. 
This can be represented as 
P(p/q) >> P(p/-q) 
This says that p is much more likely when q is true than when q is false – q makes a 
large, positive difference to whether p is true – and it can also be written as the ratio of 
the two terms being much greater than 1. 
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These two things, the relation between q and p and between q and your belief in p, may 
be in line with each other or not. That is, those relevance relations can be matched or 
mismatched. We have a relevance match for p on q 
P(b(p)/q)|P(b(p)/-q)  ≈   P(p/q)|P(p/-q) 
when the difference that q makes to whether you believe p (the term on the left hand 
side) is approximately the same as the difference that q makes to whether p is the case 
(the right hand side). We have a relevance mismatch for p on q whenever 
P(b(p)/q)|P(b(p)/-q)  ≉   P(p/q)|P(p/-q) 
That is, when q’s truth value makes significantly more of a difference or less of a 
difference to whether you believe p – the left-hand side – than it does to whether p is 
true – the right-hand side. 
In our Gettier case we had a relevance mismatch because q – Jones owning a Ford -- 
makes more difference to whether Smith believes p – someone owns a Ford – than it 
does to whether p is true. There is also a mismatch on r because r – Brown owning a 
Ford – makes more difference to whether p is true than it does to whether Smith 
believes p. So my picture of gettierization is this: when you have such a case you will 
always have a relevance mismatch on a q the subject is depending on for his belief in p, 
or a mismatch on some r that p’s truth value depends on, and either of these situations 
implies the other. 
Although this condition will be fulfilled when you have a Gettier case, the converse does 
not hold. Not all cases of relevance mismatch are actual gettierizations, since for that 
the mismatch has to be exposed. The subject who tracks q has a grip that is usually good 
enough to avoid exposure of the mismatch: as long as our Smith believes q when q is 
true and does not believe q when q is false, he will not be believing p when q is false or 
not believing p when q is true either, and so will not be Gettiered, because he is a 
subject who is only using q to determine whether to believe p. So the question what is 
happening with that relevant proposition he is not paying attention to does not often 
arise for a subject who fulfills the tracking conditions for p. And this point is not 
restricted to the tracking conditions but would apply to the other known conditions on 
knowledge that go beyond true belief. Note that this characterization of gettierization is 
not restricted to the false-lemma form of the Gettier case just described. There will 
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always be a q or q’s whose truth values the Gettiered subject’s believing p or not is 
responsive to, whether the subject has a belief state with respect to the q’s or not. That 
this analysis does not depend on the subject having a belief state with respect to q is 
borne out in the relevance match and mismatch equations, where the conditions in the 
conditional probabilities are all q and –q, and involve no b(q) or –b(q).  
To summarize my characterization of Gettier cases, we need three things, 1) that the 
person bases belief in p on q when q is false, 2) that there is a relevance mismatch on q 
for the first condition to exploit, and 3) that p is true. 1) and 2) bring out the distinctive 
element in a Gettier case by focusing on the dependence on q of the subject’s belief in 
p. Improving tracking of p by being more sensitive and adherent to p decreases the 
probability of the first feature, by either reducing or improving the quality of the 
subject’s reliance on q. 
As for the second feature, obviously increasing relevance matching decreases the 
probability of 2) directly. We can also ask whether improving the tracking of p reduces 
the probability of 2) by asking whether improved tracking of p improves relevance 
matching for p on q. Conveniently, the relationship between tracking and relevance 
matching can be expressed very neatly using total probability: 
P(b(p)/q) = P(b(p)/p)P(q/b(p).p)P(p/q)  +  P(b(p)/-p)P(q/b(p).-p)P(-p/q) 
          P(q/p)         P(q/-p) 
P(b(p)/-q) = P(b(p)/p)P(-q/b(p).p)P(p/-q) + P(b(p)/-p)P(-q/b(p).-p)P(-p/-q)  
          P(-q/p)         P(-q/-p) 
The ratio of the bold terms on the left-hand sides expresses the relevance of q to 
whether I believe p, i.e., the probability that I believe p given q divided by the 
probability that I believe p given that q is not the case. The ratio of the bold terms on 
the right-hand sides expresses the relevance of q to p, i.e., the probability that p is true 
given that q is true over the probability that p is true given that q is false. For relevance 
matching we want the relevance level of q to p, the ratio of the bolds on the right, to 
translate through these other terms into the same relevance level of q to my believing 
p, the ratio of the bolds on the left; we want the ratio of the left bolds to equal the ratio 
of the right bolds.  
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These equations seem to be complicated to evaluate, but some regularities are 
immediately apparent. For example, the level of relevance matching for p on a given q 
depends on how well I fulfill the tracking conditions for p: 
P(b(p)/q) = P(b(p)/p)P(q/b(p).p)P(p/q)  +  P(b(p)/-p)P(q/b(p).-p)P(-p/q) 
          P(q/p)         P(q/-p) 
P(b(p)/-q) = P(b(p)/p)P(-q/b(p).p)P(p/-q) + P(b(p)/-p)P(-q/b(p).-p)P(-p/-q)  
          P(-q/p)         P(-q/-p) 
The leftmost bold terms express the level to which I fulfill the adherence condition, and 
the rightmost bold terms completely determine and are determined by the level to 
which I fulfil the variation (sensitivity) condition for p.  
All of the terms set between the tracking conditions and the terms evaluating relevance 
matching make the relationship between the two features multi-dimensional, but in the 
extreme cases the relationship is simple. If I am perfectly sensitive to p – the first 
tracking condition – then I never believe p when it is false, and P(b(p)/-p) and the whole 
second summands with them, go to zero in both equations: 
P(b(p)/q) = P(b(p)/p)P(q/b(p).p)P(p/q)       
     P(q/p)  
P(b(p)/-q) = P(b(p)/p)P(-q/b(p).p)P(p/-q)  
      P(-q/p) 
If in addition I am a perfect adherer – I always believe p when p is true, the second 
tracking condition – then P(b(p)/p) is 1. That forces  
 
    
P(b(p)/q)   =   P(p/q) 5 
P(b(p)/-q)       P(p/-q) 
 
That is, perfect tracking of p implies perfect relevance matching for p on q. The same 
argument can be done for p and any q, so perfect tracking of p implies perfect relevance 
matching for p on every q. Thus, if I fulfill the extra condition for knowledge beyond true 
belief infallibly, then I cannot be gettiered. Of course, any theory with an infallibilist 
requirement can disqualify Gettier cases, because such a theory allows no room at all 
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for luck or mismatch. What is most interesting is what happens to a subject who tracks 
fallibly. The fallibilist tracking theory, with thresholds s and t set at less than 1, 
disqualifies the Gettier case I went over and many standard cases, though presumably 
not all possible cases.  
However, it is pretty clear a priori that there is no fallibilist theory that disqualifies all 
such cases (Zagzewski 1994), so the interesting questions are comparative ones of 
better and worse. Fallible tracking addresses the Gettier problem directly by directly 
reducing the chances of 2) above. This is because not only does perfect tracking of p 
imply perfectly relevance matching for p on every q, but also the better you track p the 
better you relevance match for p on every q. Fallible tracking will not make 
gettierization impossible, but improving your tracking will always make it less likely. To 
put that into context, there are fallibilist theories for which this improvement relation 
does not hold. For example, though infallible justification will eliminate the possibility of 
gettierization, increasing internalist justification of belief in p does not necessarily 
reduce the chances of mismatch, i.e. of gettierization, because internalist theories have 
no condition at all on the relation of the subject’s belief to the world other than that the 
belief actually be true. Since relevance matching is a relation between one’s beliefs and 
the world, it seems there is no way for the conditions internalist theories do have to 
guarantee improvements of relevance matching. It would be of interest to examine this 
question for non-tracking externalist theories, for example whether improving the 
reliability of one’s process of belief formation necessarily increases relevance matching.  
However, given that fallible tracking allows Gettier cases as possible one might wonder 
how I can take myself to have addressed Kvanvig’s argument that it is not possible to 
understand both the nature and the value of knowledge simultaneously because of 
Gettier cases. This is because Kvanvig’s argument was not that no criterion could rule 
out all Gettier cases – we already knew that no fallibilist theory is likely to be able to do 
that. His point was that when you come up with conditions that seem to explain the 
value of knowledge they face the Gettier problem, and the fixing that you have to do to 
address those cases is ad hoc from the point of view of the condition that insured the 
value of knowledge. 
For that claim, what is important in what we have seen so far is that the tracking 
conditions got no ad hoc tweaking, no adjustments at all, when they went from 
explaining the value of knowledge to directly reducing the chances of gettierization. The 
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same conditions did both. The tracking conditions addressed what is distinctive about 
Gettier cases specifically, rather than just generically decreasing luck: not only does 
improved tracking of p make it less likely that a subject will believe p when q is false – 
the first thing we need for a Gettier case – but also better tracking makes it less likely 
that the subject will be gettiered if he does believe p when q is false – the second, 
relevance mismatch, aspect – because his believing p or not will have a greater 
responsiveness to whether or not r is true, for all r relevant to p.  
Looking in the other direction, from relevance matching to tracking, we find a few more 
interesting relationships. For the first claim I made, that perfect tracking implies perfect 
relevance matching, the converse is also true. Perfect relevance matching for p on every 
q implies perfect tracking. However, while better tracking of p improves relevance 
matching for p on every q, increasing your relevance matching for p on some q does not 
necessarily increase your tracking of p. 
A diagram can help to explain these claims.  
 
If you track p perfectly, then whether you use an indicator q or not, your belief in p co-
varies perfectly with p. So the proposition that you believe p, b(p), is substitutable for p 
in every relevance relation p has to any q. So, your belief in p relevance matches for p 
on every q. In the other direction, if your belief in p perfectly relevance matches for p on 
every q that means that the belief in p stands in the same relation to each q as p stands 
to that q. So your believing p is substitutable for p in every relation that could affect the 
truth value of p. That is, you track p. 
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So far perfection. Human beings are not perfect trackers, and although fulfilling the 
tracking conditions does not require the use of intermediaries, creatures like us 
invariably need them. So, imagine that your believing p relates to the truth value of p 
fallibly via an intermediary, an indicator, q. 
 
 Your believing p depends on q strongly as a proxy. Then to what extent you track p 
depends on how good a proxy q is for p. If it is a perfect proxy for p – indicated by the 
solidity of the arrow between them – then q is true if and only if p is true, and the 
fidelity of your tracking of p is limited only by how closely your belief in p depends on 
that perfect proxy. If q is not a perfect proxy for p – indicated by the arrow between 
them being dashed – then your tracking has two limitations, 
 
 
so the relation between p and your belief in p is weaker than in the previous diagram. It 
is also necessarily weaker than either the relation between b(p) and q or that between p 
and q.  
For relevance matching in the imperfect case, let us call the proposition that your 




When q1 is a better proxy for p, other things equal, then your tracking of p is better. But 
also, the substitutability between q1 and p is tighter, and that makes q1 vary with the 
other factors in p’s web of relevance in a way closer to exactly the way p does. Because 
your belief in p is following q1, your belief in p automatically becomes more relevance 
matched to those other q’s as q1 becomes more substitutable for p in all of p’s relations 
to other propositions. Better tracking of p improves relevance matching on q for every 
q. 
In the opposite direction, if you improve your relevance matching for p on every q, your 
belief in p becomes more and more substitutable for p in every relation that p stands in 
to every q. That is, your believing in p or not becomes more substitutable for p in every 
circumstance that makes a difference to whether p is true or false. Thus, your belief in p 
tracks p better. However, you may improve your relevance matching for p on some q, 
say q2 , by getting your belief in p into a relation to q2 that is more similar to p’s relation 
to q2, but achieve this at the expense of your belief’s nice relation to another q, q1. 
Maybe you outsource detection of q1 so that you can get a handle on q2, and your third 
party is not as good as you are at detecting q1. In this case you improve your relevance 
matching to one q but because you reduce it with respect to another q your believing p 
or not does not necessarily become more substitutable for p’s being true or not in all 
the relations p stands in to other matters. It does not necessarily increase the chances 
your belief state is right in all of the circumstances corresponding to the truth or falsity 
of those q’s, which means you do not necessarily track p any better. Improving 
relevance matching for p on one q, or any finite number of q, does not imply improved 
tracking of p. 
From all of this we can clearly see that gettierization avoidance – i.e., relevance 
matching – is related to and not gerrymandered with respect to the requirement that 
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gives us an account of knowledge – i.e., tracking. That improved tracking implies 
improved relevance matching and so decreases the chances of gettierization answers to 
the intuition that knowledge requires gettierization avoidance. That relevance matching 
and tracking are nevertheless quite distinct properties is the reason we should not think 
of the project of giving an account of the nature of knowledge as defined by chasing 
down Gettier cases. 
 
4. The Value of Relevance Matching and the Nature of Understanding 
In answer to Kvanvig’s challenge, and further to my point that gettierization-proofing is 
not per se a defining ingredient of knowledge, I will explain why gettierization avoidance 
is valuable without presupposing that knowledge is valuable. For this it will suffice to 
explain why relevance matching is valuable even if we do not value having an ESS in the 
true-belief game.  
We know that tracking is the best insurance that the appropriateness of our belief states 
will survive time and changing circumstances, for propositions about which it matters 
that we have correct belief states. What is relevance matching intuitively, and what 
does it give us? I think we can naturally say of the gettierized subject discussed that he 
does not understand why it is true that someone in the office owns a Ford, and I 
propose that relevance matching for p on a sufficient set of q’s is the key to 
understanding why p is true. For current purposes I will assume as a brute fact that 
understanding is valuable. 
Intuitively, understanding why p is true is different from knowing that p is true, and this 
account will be able to explain how. Whatever the value is of understanding why a 
proposition p is true, or why it would be true if it were true, it is not merely for 
possessing or even preserving correct belief states with regard to p’s truth value. 
Indeed, when we ask why p is true or why it would be true if it were true, we 
presuppose that it is true or hypothetically imagine that it is, respectively. Although 
understanding why p might be true could help us determine whether it is, p’s truth 
value is not per se the concern of the “Why?” question, and this is why the actual and 
hypothetical “Why?” questions can sensibly be given the very same answer. A second 
intuitive difference between knowing that p is true and understanding why p is or would 
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be true is that understanding involves appreciation of more than p alone. Relevance 
matching will give us a compelling picture of what that appreciation should be like.  
The fact that knowledge and understanding are different has a further significance. 
Combined with my view that the value of gettierization avoidance is improved 
understanding, it provides some justification for my resistance to the expectation that a 
theory of what knowledge is must rule out all Gettier cases. We do not need to 
understand why p is true in order to know that it is. In the Gettier case discussed here 
we do not want to have to say that the subject should check whether Brown owns a 
Ford before we give him the knowledge star on his forehead, and we do not have to. 
Smith can know that p is true despite his defect of not understanding why it is true. 
There are a variety of options for stipulating how much relevance matching there must 
be, and to what set of q a belief in p must be relevance matched, in order to count as 
understanding why p is true, and in what way. I will start with a very strong definition of 
what it is to improve one’s understanding of why p is true, and then explain some ways 
it can be qualified, extended, and multiplied. This definition will also serve as the 
template for comparing levels of understanding in the static case since one state’s being 
an improvement over another is the same as one state being better than another 
according to the relevant criteria.  
As a first pass, understanding of why p is true improves6only if there is an increase in 
relevance matching for p on some q, and no decrease in relevance matching on any 
other q of such a degree as to outweigh the increase.7 We will see below that we need a 
further condition for a full definition of understanding. We also need to recognize some 
weaker but significant variations on and partial versions of the condition just stated. For 
example, there can be a kind of increase in understanding if we improve relevance 
matching on some q while losing some matching on others. Maybe we stopped caring 
about the q‘s of a particular type; our appreciation of these newly matched q’s would 
still have increased our understanding of the things we care about.  
Also, the definition of improvement in understanding just given can easily be 
generalized to the case where we understand better by appreciating more about why p 
would be true if it were true, whether it is, or we know it is, or not. The current account 
identifies multiple ways that one can have partial understanding. One might have 
overall quite good relevance matching for p on all q while the tracking level of p that this 
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brings one does not meet the threshold chosen for knowledge. One might understand 
why p would be true although it is actually false because one may relevance match for 
many q, and even track p, while p is false. Relevance matching and the tracking 
conditions are dispositional and fallibilist. For this reason one may also relevance match 
for p on many q’s while some of those q’s are actually false, and nothing says one does 
not actually believe they are true. Of course, frequently actually having belief in a given 
q when that q was not true (or vice versa) would not be consistent with relevance 
matching on q, because it is not consistent with having the right dispositions to believe 
p. But these general points agree with an intuitive sense many have that one can have a 
good deal of understanding of why p is true, or would be true, without all of one’s 
beliefs about the surrounding subject matter being true. 
Understanding has the dimensions of breadth and depth. Breadth would correspond to 
relevance matching to a large number of q’s spread from p far out into p’s web of 
relevance. Depth would come from the density of the q’s one relevance matches to, 
from the number of q’s one matches to between p and a given q or between one q and 
another. Some of the kinds of intermediate q’s would be causes, correlated matters, 
and laws and generalizations of which the relation between q and p or between two q’s 
are instances.  
It is not sufficient for understanding to have knowledge of a long conjunction of 
propositions in the subject matter of p, as Elgin put it when she drew attention to the 
feature of understanding that involves an appreciation of the coherence and 
connections among those propositions. (Elgin 2009) Relevance matching evidently 
requires appreciation of the connections, since one’s dispositions to believe p are 
required to mirror p’s relevance relations and lack of relations with all other 
propositions, or an appropriate subset of them.  
The partial definition of improvement of understanding, combined with our earlier point 
that increase in relevance matching for p on all q increases the level of tracking of p, 
imply that improving one’s understanding of why p is true will improve one’s tracking, 
hence knowledge, of p. Combining this with the fact cited earlier that increasing tracking 
of p increases relevance matching for p on all q we see that at the most abstract level, 
knowledge and understanding as so far defined are very closely related. Indeed, as we 
saw above, perfect tracking and perfect relevance matching are logically equivalent. This 
may seem to make the two phenomena more closely related than intuition allows.  
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Knowledge and relevance matching, hence understanding, have different values, as we 
saw earlier, and logical equivalence does not make them the same thing, but there are 
further pragmatic differences, to be discussed presently, and in the final analysis here 
the concepts will not be logically equivalent either.  
First the pragmatic differences. We live in the short and medium run, and whether we 
approach epistemic harmony with p by aiming at knowledge or at understanding can 
lead to dramatically different consequences at these timescales. For contingent reasons, 
unlike gods we have to use intermediaries in order to track p. At any given point we only 
have enough resources to address some factors relevant to p and not others. 
Sometimes a few intermediaries are enough to track p; sometimes it takes only one 
indicator. This is what we should look for if our goal is simply to be able to predict or be 
in line with the disposition of p’s truth value in the future. Tracking p logically implies a 
high level of relevance matching to all q – which creates a problem I will address below 
– but a grasp on one indicator will not make us aware of the other q that p and my belief 
in p are so similarly related to. It may give us nothing at all to say about other factors 
relevant to p.   
Instead of searching for an indicator that will allow us to efficiently follow the truth 
value of p, we could choose to spread our resources and investigate multiple q’s, trying 
to get at their relation to p. Since we would not necessarily increase net relevance 
matching we would not necessarily improve tracking of p, or understanding strictly 
speaking as so far defined, and if we did improve tracking it would not be by the most 
efficient means. For purposes of getting a handle on p’s truth value this would be a 
roundabout strategy of inquiry. However, in improving relevance matching to some q 
we would have made the kind of partial progress toward understanding what makes p 
true discussed above. Moreover, as we went about this we would sometimes, though as 
I will explain below not necessarily always, be making ourselves aware of more factors 
relevant to whether p is true, whether they suffice together to be a highly tracking 
indicator or not. Although I do not think awareness of the factors is necessary for their 
useability, there are definitely situations where awareness can make them more 
useable. Whether you take a knowledge approach or an understanding approach to p, 
your efforts will also take you along the road to the other, but since you will typically 
have different results in the short run, which approach you choose matters very much.  
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Knowledge and understanding are even more different than the partial definition of 
understanding provides for, and different for more than pragmatic reasons. I drew out 
above how it is that one can have a lot of understanding of why p would be true without 
knowing that p is true. One can also know that p is the case without understanding why 
it is, and this is not merely a pragmatic matter, but goes to what understanding is.  
One has knowledge without understanding when one uses a good indicator but has no 
grasp of other relevant matters. If your thermometer is in good working order then you 
can know that Mr. Washington has a fever merely by having your belief that he has this 
symptom co-vary with the thermometer reading. That is because the thermometer will 
give you tracking of his body temperature – you will believe that he has that 
temperature roughly if and only if he does. But this tracking surely does not give you 
understanding of why he has this symptom; understanding in this case would involve a 
diagnosis, or an account of the physiology of temperature regulation in mammals. We 
saw above that it is a logical fact that fulfilling the tracking conditions for p implies that 
your belief in p has a high level of relevance matching on all q, that is all things related 
to the fact that Mr. Washington has a fever – the more substitutable your belief in p is 
for p, the more it will stand in the same dispositional relation to every q as p stands to 
that q. So the condition that increase in understanding requires increase in net 
relevance matching alone would imply that a thermometer can give you understanding 
of why a patient has a fever, and thus is too weak to provide a full definition.8 
We might think that the best way to fix this is to make a distinction between indicators 
of p and what makes p true, and to require that the subject be in touch with the latter 
as well as the former. However, this would not address the problem since tracking p 
already makes the subject relevance match for p on the q that make p true because it 
logically implies that the subject relevance matches on every q. The problem is not with 
which q she is required to match, but the nature of the matching. What the subject 
merely following the thermometer does not have is states corresponding to the q’s. If 
the subject tracks p then her belief in p will co-vary with the q’s as p co-varies with the 
q’s, but she will not necessarily own anything that corresponds to the q’s. 
A natural thought is to make a further requirement that the subject have beliefs about 
the q’s in p’s web of relevance, but I think that this would be too strong. Having beliefs 
about the q’s suggests an ability to call up those considerations and talk about them. 
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Some epistemologists have endorsed a requirement of reflective access in order to be 
counted as understanding. Thus, Duncan Pritchard: 
Understanding clearly is very amenable to an account along internalist lines, in the sense that it is hard 
to make sense of how an agent could possess understanding and yet lack good reflectively accessible 
grounds in support of that understanding. Understanding thus cannot be ‘opaque’ to the subject in the 
way that knowledge, by externalist lights at least, can sometimes be. (Pritchard 2015) 
However, I do not think this jibes with how we use the word “understanding”. There are 
many cases of understanding where our grounds are not reflectively accessible. If I 
understand why she married Gabriel, that does not imply that I could list all of the 
factors relevant to her decision. I would probably be able to list some, but for the rest I 
could say merely that I have a feel for how she thinks and their relationship, and if I 
know her, Gabriel, and the situation well then I think we would allow that I have more 
understanding than I am able to explain. Again, if I say I understand why he is 
traumatized, I do not mean that I could list the elements of the torture he was 
delivered, and explain how each affected his psyche. An indication that I understand, 
and even, possibly, that with respect to some factors I understand more deeply than an 
ability to speak about it would show, is my feeling a shiver when I hear a description of 
things that were done to him. I agree with Elgin 2009 that it is not understanding if it is 
not useable by the subject, but states that are not reflectively accessible can enable and 
otherwise affect our actions, thus be useable, and just as they can co-vary with the 
belief in p, they can co-vary with other beliefs, including beliefs that are reflectively 
accessed and used explicitly in inferences. 
I reject the requirement that the subject who understands have beliefs corresponding to 
the q’s she relevance matches on, but the belief requirement is on the right track in 
requiring that the subject own something that is disposed to “move” in relation to the 
subject’s belief in p in the same way that the q’s’ truth values are disposed to move in 
relation to the truth value of p. Thus, I will not only require that the subject’s belief in p 
move with respect to the q’s in the same way that p moves with them, i.e., relevance 
matching, but also that the subject have states corresponding to the q’s relevant to p 
that move with the subject’s belief in p in the same way that the q’s move with respect 
to p. The subject will thereby possess in herself a dynamical copy of p and its web of 
relevance. The subject will possess not just a static image like a photograph but a 
simulation, in the strict sense requiring that the dynamics of the simulation follow the 
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same laws as the process being simulated. The same simulation quality will obtain when 
the states in the subject that correspond to the qi happen to be beliefs, in virtue of the 
dynamical web of relevance matching that those beliefs achieve. Although the view of 
understanding proposed here is not in any way restricted to the case of understanding 
human behavior, it is suggestive as a way of fleshing out the simulationist view of how 
we read other minds.1  
The contrast between understanding as mere relevance matching, which is too weak, 
and the subject relevance matching by means of her own states can be seen in the 
following diagrams: 
 
                                                             
1 When the subject’s states that carry the relevance matching are beliefs, then the person’s understanding may be 
reflectively accessible as a theory, in the broad sense of that term used when discussing our knowledge of other 
minds. In the terms of that discussion, when the subject relevance matches via states that are not beliefs she 
would be seen as simulating. Both count as understanding on my view in virtue of the relevance matching rather 
than because of the type of state that carries it, a view I develop further in Roush (2016), and both have the 




The subject on the bottom not only has a belief in p that is dispositionally related to the 
qi’s in the same ways that p is related to those qi’s but also has states si that her belief is 
related to in the same ways as p is related to the qi’s. If the relevance matching relations 
are fulfilled, then the si and qi will be related in a regular way – the horizontal dotted 
arrows below -- that is a relation in which the si’s track the qi’s, respectively, to some 
degree, in the sense of tracking defined above.9 This would look as follows: 
 
It is tempting to require that the subject’s states, si, that correspond to the q’s be if not 
beliefs then at least mental states, but the example of the shiver makes me reluctant to 
go even that far. A shiver is, or at least includes, a bodily reaction, and this is not merely 
accidentally related to the understanding, since the torture itself was inflicted on the 
body. If the states need not be mental they could be located in the foot, though, and 
how absurd it would be to think we could understand why p is true via a network of 
foot-dispositions! However, the foot states still have to be dispositionally related to the 
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subject’s belief in p in the right way in order for the set-up to count as understanding, 
and the belief in p is at least partly a mental state, so it is not as if the mind can be 
entirely uninvolved. Understanding by foot might be inefficient and tiring given that a 
foot also has other things to do, but that is a pragmatic matter.  
Understanding as simulation, as participation of the understander in a working model of 
what the understandee undergoes, provides a suggestive picture of what is happening 
in the phenomenon of compassion fatigue and burnout among mental health workers 
and emergency room nurses. Understanding by foot might sound hilarious but if caring 
human beings cannot suppress the surely unconscious impulse to simulate, if no one 
can understand without simulating, then a strategy of scaling down the simulation and 
displacing it to a different location in oneself than the phenomenon is in the sufferer 
could be helpful for those caring for distressed and traumatized people to avoid 
becoming distressed and traumatized themselves. To account for the fact that it is 
possible to have knowledge without understanding I think we have to require that the 
subject own states corresponding to the q’s and not just the p, but it should not be 
required that those states be always located in a particular part of the understander. 
Summary 
Relevance matching is a good way to make explicit both what is missing in Gettier cases, 
and some essential features of understanding why proposition p is true, for any p. It 
allows us to see that avoiding gettierization is valuable without presupposing the value 
of knowledge and to trace out some key similarities and differences between knowledge 
and understanding. It allows us to account for the dimensions of breadth, depth, 
connectedness, and useability of understanding, and to explain why it is possible to 
have knowledge that p is true without understanding why it is true, and how it is 
possible to gain some understanding of why p could be true without gaining knowledge 
of whether it is. The picture of understanding as simulation that emerges, when in the 
final definition we add a condition of ownership of a web of states in addition to belief 
in p, is suggestive as a way of fleshing out what it means to understand other minds. 
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1 I am grateful to audiences at the Eastern APA 2012, University of British Columbia, UC Berkeley Logic Colloquium, 
King’s College London, and Kyoto University, and to Michael Della Rocca, David Papineau, Bill Brewer, and Jake 
Wojtowicz in particular for helpful feedback. 
2 Kaplan’s argument is general, including whatever criterion one might like to substitute for justification. 
3 Decomposed this way those X conditions that are not tracking will typically be disjunctive, but that just makes 
them what are called “mixed” strategies. 
4 I assume that there are no other people in the office. Otherwise Brown’s not owning a Ford would not imply the 
falsity of “Someone in the office owns a Ford”. 
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5 P(b(p)/p) = 1 implies P(b(p).p) = P(p). From there, algebra gives P(q/b(p).p)/P(q/p) = 1, and likewise for the –q 
case. So, P(q/b(p).p)|P(q/p) = P(-q/b(p).p)|P(-q/p) = 1. This implies P(b(p)/q) = P(p/q)  and P(b(p)/-q) = P(p/-q), 
which together imply P(b(p)/q)|P(b(p)/-q) = P(p/q)|P(p/-q), i.e., perfect relevance matching for p on q. 
 
6 The concept I am defining takes as object why a proposition is, or would be, the case in contrast to many who 
define a concept of understanding a subject matter, e.g., the Comanche dominance of the Southern Plains. (E.g., 
Kvanvig 2003, Elgin 2009, Pritchard 2015) The reason usually given for the latter is that understanding that p is not 
appreciably different from knowing that p. But “I understand that p” sounds like “I gather that p”, and 
understanding why p is, or would be, the case, is definitely much more than either of those. 
7 Clearly this comparison will require a measure for relevance matching. My preference is the likelihood ratio, but 
the issue is beyond the scope of this paper. 
8 The fact that tracking brings relevance matching raises the question how a Gettier case as defined in this paper is 
possible at all. The reason is that both concepts, knowledge and understanding, are defined fallibly, and the 
character of the spheres of cases in which we are allowed to fall short is different for the tracking and relevance 
matching criteria, even if they are, so to speak, the same “size”. This is an issue to which the way of measuring 
relevance matching will likely matter. 
9 The relations between the qi’s and b(p) and between b(p) and the si’s will themselves will be tracking relations of 
some degree in both directions, and I showed in Ch. 5 (2005) that tracking has the property of transitivity enough, 
so each si will track its qi to a derivable minimal level that depends on the levels of the two tracking relations 
supporting their relation.  
